I believed in staying hardcore and learning from our mistakes, but Microsoft struggled to pivot from its established model to embrace new opportunities in mobile.

Microsoft had an opportunity to become a significant player in mobile before Android took off, but they were too locked into their existing business model to adapt quickly.

We missed the chance to innovate in mobile and search, which were critical areas where other trillion-dollar companies thrived outside of Microsoft.

We needed to develop new capabilities to compete effectively in the mobile and search markets, but we didn't realize how different those businesses would be. The true competitor for Microsoft in mobile was Android, not Apple, as Android monetized through advertising and offered free services, while Microsoft relied on licensing revenue.

We got caught in the mindset of being just a platform company, which limited our ability to innovate and adapt to new market demands.

We learned that many innovative ideas from 1999 were ahead of their time, and it was crucial to stay the course and believe in the potential of mobile technology.

From '92 to '98, we experienced a liftoff primarily driven by Windows and applications, not enterprise solutions.

If we were to build a phone today, we might not create an app store as we know it; instead, we would focus on allowing users to express their needs and let the system respond accordingly.

I think we had it backwards by creating a company around a hot technology instead of focusing on a real problem to solve.