Bill and I disagreed on many key decisions, including whether to pursue hardware, which created tension in our relationship.

I learned that the technology co-founders I initially brought in weren't the right fit and didn't have the skills to take the business where I wanted it to go, so I had to fire them.

I believed in staying hardcore and learning from our mistakes, but Microsoft struggled to pivot from its established model to embrace new opportunities in mobile.

During the disillusionment phase, we struggled to attract investment due to recent failures of other hardware companies, which made investors hesitant.

I realized I wasn't good at product management and had to let go of that role to allow someone more qualified to lead product development.

We chose not to acquire a competitor because I didn't like their culture; I believed our mission-driven approach would outlast their profit-driven one.

We decided to go to market with hardware vendors instead of building an enterprise sales force, finding ways to help them profit.

We decided to create our own hardware device instead of licensing our technology, believing we could do it better ourselves. Building consumer hardware as a startup was considered totally insane in the early 2000s, with very few successful examples to follow.

We engaged with hardware vendors like IBM and HP, trying to convince them to partner with us, despite initial resistance.