I feel good about being recognized as a key figure in building Microsoft's enterprise business, but I also regret that we lost our consumer focus along the way.

I was determined to prove that Microsoft could be an enterprise company because if we couldn't sell to businesses, we would be limited in growth.

I believed in staying hardcore and learning from our mistakes, but Microsoft struggled to pivot from its established model to embrace new opportunities in mobile.

Microsoft had an opportunity to become a significant player in mobile before Android took off, but they were too locked into their existing business model to adapt quickly.

We missed the chance to innovate in mobile and search, which were critical areas where other trillion-dollar companies thrived outside of Microsoft.

During my tenure, I prioritized establishing strong relationships with IT departments, which was essential for Microsoft's enterprise success.

We needed to develop new capabilities to compete effectively in the mobile and search markets, but we didn't realize how different those businesses would be. The true competitor for Microsoft in mobile was Android, not Apple, as Android monetized through advertising and offered free services, while Microsoft relied on licensing revenue.

After IBM divorced us in 1990, we realized we needed to figure out how to build our own enterprise sales strategy, which was not Bill Gates' passion area.

Entering the Enterprise market can be daunting, but it's a necessary step for growth and innovation. An engineer left the company, stating that we wouldn't succeed in the enterprise market and that the company was going to fail.